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Preliminaries to a content-based classification of metonymy*

Abstract

Previous literature on the classification of metonymy has mainly concentrated on the relationship between source and target (e.g. Radden & Kövecses 1999, Peirsman & Geeraerts 2006a). More recent, pragmatically oriented classifications are concerned with the role of conceptual metonymy in meaning construction, i.e. at which level of meaning construction a certain metonymy is applied as an inferential tool (e.g. Thornburg & Panther 1997, Panther & Thornburg 1999). At the heart of these latter approaches is the assumption that conceptual metonymy cannot be reduced to acts of reference. Interestingly enough, no classification of metonymy has been suggested which concentrates on the type of the mental content participating in the metonymic process. In this paper I outline such a content-based approach. According to the type of the target content the following classes of metonymy can be set up: THING-, EVENT-, PROPERTY-, PROPOSITION- and speech act metonymies, which can be further subdivided based on the type of the source content. Furthermore, I argue that my content-based approach is compatible with and complementary to earlier contiguity-based and pragmatic classifications, since certain contiguity relations between source and target and certain pragmatic functions of metonymy are closely related to the type of the mental content targeted by the source content. Future investigations integrating these three aspects of metonymy may contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon.

Keywords: metonymy, classification of metonymy, reference point, mental access, conceptual content, metonymic inference

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1 Introduction

Within cognitive semantics\(^1\) the study of conceptual metonymy has only established itself as a significant line of investigation relatively recently (e.g. Panther & Radden 1999, Panther & Thornburg 2003a, Benczes, Barcelona & Ruiz de Mendoza 2011, Fu 2012). Up to this point one of the main goals of cognitive linguistic research on metonymy has been to provide a massive body of evidence that metonymy is a fundamental conceptual process, ubiquitous in language and thinking, even more so than metaphor (e.g. Barcelona 2000, Dirven & Pörings 2002, Panther, Thornburg & Barcelona 2009). The cognitive linguistic literature on metonymy abounds in metonymy definitions which differ in certain details and refinements,\(^2\) but their commonalities are best grasped by the definition of Radden and Kövecses (1999: 21): "Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model." Their definition relies heavily on Langacker’s conception of metonymy as a reference point phenomenon (1993), whereas the metonymic source serves as a reference point to the intended target, i.e. it provides mental access to the target.

This very broad notion of metonymy and the primary concern of contemporary cognitive linguistic research on metonymy to establish it as a fundamental cognitive operation means that it has become almost all-encompassing, covering an extremely broad range of linguistic and cognitive phenomena. In order to avoid the risk of the notion becoming so broad that hardly any generalizations can be made about the diverse phenomena it describes, classifications of metonymy have been established with the aim of forming homogeneous classes of metonymy that can be accounted for in generalizable terms.

The cognitive linguistic and pre-cognitive linguistic literature on metonymy is at least as abundant in classifications of metonymy as in metonymy definitions. The most widely used basis for setting up a typology of metonymy is the relationship between the source and the target (see for example Norrick 1981, Kövecses & Radden 1998, Radden &

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\(^1\) All through the paper, whenever I use the terms 'cognitive linguistics' or 'cognitive semantics' I refer to holistic cognitive linguistics in the tradition of George Lakoff and Ronald W. Langacker.

\(^2\) For finer-grained definitions of conceptual metonymy see, for example, Panther & Thornburg (2004) or Barcelona (2002).
Kövecses 1999, Peirsman & Geeraerts 2006a). Classifications conceived in this tradition can never be exhaustive. Due to their very nature, there are always borderline cases; the labels of different classes and sub-classes and their taxonomies often alternate; the boundaries between sub-classes are fuzzy and sometimes even minor inconsistencies arise. These flaws arise naturally, if we keep in mind the fact that these classifications eventually attempt to list, describe and classify all existing and conceivable relationships between two concepts within the same knowledge structure (or Idealized Cognitive Model).

Other classifications are concerned with the pragmatic function of metonymy (e.g. Warren 1999, 2002, Panther & Thornburg 1999, 2003b). These approaches emphasize that metonymy is not necessarily connected to an act of reference (e.g. Barcelona 2005, 2009 and 2011) and they accordingly treat referential metonymy as a – prototypical and very common – sub-class of metonymy and point out that non-referential cases of metonymy are far from being exceptional. Warren (1999, 2002, and 2006) distinguishes between referential and propositional metonymies, based on their linguistic features and truth-conditionality. Thornburg and Panther (1997) and Panther and Thornburg (1999) divide metonymies into classes based on their pragmatic characteristics; they speak of propositional metonymies with referential and predicational sub-classes and illocutionary or speech act metonymies. Radden (2012) makes a distinction between referential and EVENT metonymies.

Interestingly enough, no typology of metonymy has been set up that is based on the conceptual content involved in the metonymic process, i.e. on the conceptual nature of the target accessed and that of the reference point serving as the metonymic source. In this paper I set out to propose a preliminary classification of metonymy that focuses on the type of the target and the source content. The question I investigate is how metonymy can be classified on the basis of the type of conceptual content involved in the metonymic process. I argue that well-defined and homogeneous classes of metonymy can be set up according to what type of conceptual content is accessed through what type of metonymic reference points.

My argumentation is structured as follows. In Section 2 I briefly sketch out a notion of metonymy in which metonymy is necessarily connected to an act of reference. The section also provides a brief outline of the types of conceptual content that can be referred to, and hence can be targeted by metonymy (target content) and those that can
serve as metonymic reference points (source content). In Section 3 I set up the following classes of metonymy based on the type of the target content: THING- (3.1), EVENT- (3.2), PROPERTY- (3.3), PROPOSITION- (3.4) and speech act metonymies (3.5). In Section 4 I argue that my classification of metonymy is compatible with and can complement a contiguity-based classification (Peirsman & Geeraerts 2006a, 2006b) and that it is in accordance with some of the above mentioned pragmatically oriented classifications of metonymy (Panther & Thornburg 1999, 2003b). My results are summarized in Section 5.

2 A referential view of metonymy and the conceptual content involved in metonymy

It is a widely held view among cognitive linguistically oriented metonymy researchers that metonymy cannot be reduced to acts of reference (among others Barcelona 2011, Sweep 2009, Panther & Thornburg 2004, Panther 2005, Ruiz de Mendoza 2000). As a consequence, they consider referential metonymy to be only a sub-class, and distinguish it from non-referential cases. This sub-class embraces almost exclusively nominal metonymies or metonymies whose target is a THING (the only possible referent in the traditional view). Elsewhere (Tóth in preparation) I argue that the reason for this almost consensual view concerning the referentiality of metonymy is that these approaches implicitly accept a traditional notion of reference that is too narrowly conceived for cognitive linguistic purposes.

I plead (ibid.) for a broad notion of reference that is more in line with the aims of cognitive linguistics; namely I equate the act of reference with the mental activation of certain conceptual contents with the help of linguistic reference points, with the aim of further purposes of meaning construction (e.g. combining them into larger units of conceptual content, arriving at propositions, drawing further inferences). According to this notion, referents are not elements of the extra-linguistic reality but of a construal of this reality, and they are

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3 A minority of cognitive linguists maintains that metonymy is of referential nature; see for example Croft (1993/2002).

4 Although this ‘traditional’ view of reference is almost never described explicitly in cognitive semantic research on metonymy, it seems to me that it is even more conservative than that of Searle (1969).
not restricted to THINGS. In other words, I argue that mental access can be provided to any type of conceptual content, i.e. we do not only refer to our concepts of THINGS; accordingly in my approach every metonymy is considered to be referential. The referential view of metonymy outlined here conceives metonymy at least as broadly as the standard view of conceptual metonymy (Radden & Kövecses 1999); as a result homogeneous classes of metonymy need to be established about which certain generalizations can be made. The type of conceptual content accessed by the metonymic reference point (the intended referent or target) offers itself as a basis of this classification, while the type of the conceptual content that serves as the reference point (the source) can serve as a criterion to set up sub-classes within the classes.

This proposal calls for a consideration of the question of what types of conceptual content can be distinguished. The referents of different linguistic units are different types of conceptual content, and vice versa, different linguistic units provide mental access to different types of conceptual content. Noun phrases usually activate THINGS or abstract entities that are very often construed as THINGS with the as-

5 It is important to note that the view that the target of a metonymy is not restricted to THINGS, and the class of metonymic expressions cannot be narrowed down to nominal cases is widely shared in cognitive linguistics. My approach differs in the notion of reference it relies on. I do not see a difference in the mode through which different types of mental content are accessed for further inferential purposes; hence I regard the mental activation of any type of content to be an act of reference. This is not to say that I would deny that there are differences regarding the purpose of this mental activation, for example arriving at an implicitly intended referent, singling out a THING for predication, singling out an EVENT to be predicated of THINGS, constructing propositions, arriving at conversational implicatures or figuring out the illocutionary purposes.

6 A similar view is proposed by Mihatsh (2009), who points out the correlation between nouns and THINGS. See also Langacker (1987a). The following enumeration is in need of elaboration. My claims here are rather intuitive than empirically well-founded. The types of conceptual content require further research in cognitive linguistics, cognitive psychology and neuroscience. It is even questionable whether it is justified to gather all of these contents under the umbrella term 'conceptual'; it is, for instance, hard to draw the line between conceptual and propositional content. What I outline here is mainly in accordance with Langacker's (1987b) and Radden and Dirven's (2007) findings and with the types of conceptual content they name, but I do not follow their terminology strictly. I claim here merely that any kind of mental content can be made available through reference points. This is the only common feature of the listed contents I argue for, the specifics of their structure and characterization are left out of consideration. I do not claim that they could be listed, characterized and classified exhaustively.
sistance of ontological metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). THINGS can be organized into taxonomically built categories or can belong to functionally structured DOMAINS, FRAMES or SITUATIONS. These can also be made available by noun phrases, but can also be accessed through verbs. THINGS can have certain PROPERTIES, usually accessed through adjectives serving as linguistically manifest reference points. The referents of adjectives are SCALES, against which certain PROPERTIES of THINGS or EVENTS are measured.

THINGS can interact with each other, can be related to each other, and can be involved in various relationships. They are very often parts of EVENTS, they are in certain STATES, can go through CHANGE and participate in SITUATIONS. These contents are most readily available with the help of verbs serving as linguistic reference points. Accordingly, verbs provide mental access to contents in which THINGS can be embedded or in which they are related to each other, for instance EVENTS, ACTIONS or STATES. These can be further characterized by certain circumstances or PROPERTIES, for example MANNER, PLACE, TIME, to which we refer with the help of adverbs and various morphologic and syntactic tools.

Along these lines it is not unreasonable to assume that linguistic signs that have traditionally been assigned an exclusively functional role, in fact mentally activate some kind of conceptual content. This is in line with the assumptions of cognitive linguistics that we do have concepts of, for example, PERSON, NUMBER, TENSE, ASPECT, POSSIBILITY, ACTUALITY, GENERICITY etc. In my view, although these concepts are usually expressed by grammatical elements, only relational and organized very differently than more easily grasparable concepts (for instance THINGS), they are still made available or accessed during meaning construction and contribute to the overall construal of a situation.

Similarly, complex expressions provide mental access to complex contents; in this sense even PROPOSITIONS and relations between PROPOSITIONS (e.g. with the help of connectives) can be referred to.

3 A content-based classification of metonymy

The classification I propose here rests on the rejection of the implicit assumption of the above cited classifications that an act of reference is restricted to nominal expressions with THINGS as intended refer-
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ents, i.e. metonymy is considered to be of a referential nature, in the above proposed sense of the notion 'reference'. As a result of this view it is reasonable to assume that the category of metonymy can be divided into classes according to the type of the conceptual content accessed and the type of the linguistic sign or conceptual content providing access. It follows that both conceptual and linguistic metonymies can be classified according to the type of their reference points and the conceptual content they activate. The classes of metonymy are arranged along a continuum ranging from classes displaying more prototypical features of referentiality and metonymicity\(^7\) (THING-metonymies) through ones displaying less prototypical features (PROPERTY- and EVENT-metonymies) to almost marginal cases (PROPOSITION-metonymies).

The prototypical structure of the category 'metonymy' is due to the organization of the category 'act of reference' on which it is based. I assume this latter category to be radially structured with members at the center displaying more prototypical features and with members at the periphery displaying less prototypical features. At the core are instances where nominal linguistic expressions access individual THINGS, and at the periphery, cases in which a PROPOSITION provides access to another PROPOSITION. Based on these assumptions, according to the conceptual content involved in the metonymic relationship the following major metonymy-types can be distinguished (without making any claim to completeness).

3.1 **THING-metonymies**

The expressions I label as THING-metonymies are basically cases called referential metonymies in other approaches.\(^8\) The reason I start establishing classes of metonymy with THING-metonymies is twofold. First, they seem to be the prototypical type of metonymy, as has been pointed out in connection with referential metonymies (e.g. Barcelona 2002, 2005 and 2009 or Warren 2006). And second, they are applied at an initial stage of meaning construction,\(^9\) i.e. they are used as a

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7 For the degrees of metonymicity see Barcelona (2002) and (2011).

8 For various distinctions between referential metonymy and other metonymic phenomena see Stallard (1993), Panther & Thornburg (1999) and Warren (1999 and 2002).

9 For the role of metonymy in meaning construction see Panther & Thornburg (2004) and Panther (2005); for the role of metonymy at different layers of concep-
mechanism of reference-fixing; in other words these metonymies are used to target and to find conceptual content of which something is predicated or said.

THING-metonymies are metonymies whose target (or intended referent) is a THING, which is accessed with the help of a reference point content that is related to it within the same Idealized Cognitive Model.\(^{10}\) Indirect mental access can be provided to a THING through other THINGS, through a PROPERTY of the THING, or through its role or function in a situation or frame. Accordingly, THING-metonymies can be divided into sub-classes based on the conceptual type of the source through which they are accessed. THING-THING-metonymies are exemplified by the following expressions:

(1) **The ham sandwich** is waiting for his check. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 35)
(2) **The first violin** has the flu. (Panther & Radden 1999: 9)
(3) **The kettle** is boiling. (Warren 2002: 116)
(4) **He played Mozart.**
(5) Hun. **A 126-os szoba mindig vidám.**
   'Room 126 is always happy.'

Examples (1-4) are well-known and often analyzed in the literature. In (1) the meal (HAM SANDWICH) ordered by the costumer provides mental access to the CUSTOMER who ordered it within the frame or ICM of a RESTAURANT. In (2) the musical instrument (FIRST VIOLIN) serves as a conceptual reference point to the person who plays the first violin.
(VIOLINIST). In (3) the CONTAINER of the water (KETTLE) mentally accesses the CONTENT of the kettle (WATER) within a culturally entrenched model of TEA-MAKING, embedded in Anglo-Saxon tradition. It is important to note that this frame is highly culture dependent. In other cultures WATER and KETTLE do not constitute such closely related entities within the TEA-MAKING frame as in the Anglo-Saxon model. This could be the reason that, for example, the German and Hungarian word-for-word translations would sound odd: Ger. #Die Kanne kocht and Hun. #Fő a kanna, though the most natural Hungarian translation that would come closest to the English version would also be metonymic: Hun. Fő a tea. 'The tea is boiling', where the TEA to be made from the boiling water provides access to the WATER, whereas the literal version (Hun. Fő a víz. 'The water is boiling') would not convey that the frame against which the sentence is interpreted is the frame of TEA-MAKING. Example (4) is an instance of the well-known AUTHOR FOR WORK metonymy, in which the composer (MOZART) refers to a piece of music composed by him (MUSIC BY MOZART). The selection of these expressions may give us a glimpse of how diverse the relationship between a metonymic target and source can be, but they all have in common that they involve THINGS connected by a relationship that is relevant within a given frame or ICM.

The Hungarian example (5), where the place (ROOM 126) stands for its INHABITANTS or the people working there, and the fact that it can readily be translated with the help of the same metonymy into English indicate that THING-metonymies are widely applied among typologically otherwise unrelated languages. Brdar (2009) argues, based on his earlier cross-linguistic investigations into specific metonymies (see for instance Brdar & Brdar-Szabó 2003, 2009 and Brdar-Szabó 2009), that referential metonymies tend to be more widely spread among languages than non-referential metonymies. The same might well apply for THING-metonymies. These results point towards the idea that THING-metonymies are indeed the prototypical cases of metonymy. In my approach the prototypicality of THING-metonymies can be traced back to the conceptual properties of THINGS (being relatively stable, autonomous and salient) as the most ideal referents. This view is also supported by the findings of Mihratsch (2009) and the psychological experimental results cited there.

As opposed to the examples discussed so far, THINGS can be accessed not just via other related THINGS, but also by their relevant
PROPERTIES as in (6), where the German family name Klein is motivated by a PROPERTY-THING-metonymy:


A slightly more complex example is provided in (7):

(7)  Secretary on the intercom, introducing a visitor: Mayor, that's your ten o'clock.

The target of the metonymy at hand is a person; hence it is a THING-metonymy. The way the target is accessed is a little more complicated than the rest of the examples. Ten o'clock can be considered a PROPERTY of the target only if first the EVENT content of the frame MEETING is activated. Within this frame the TIME of the MEETING is singled out to serve as reference point for a PARTICIPANT of the MEETING, consequently it may be classified as a ROLE IN A FRAME for A ROLE IN A FRAME for A THING metonymic chain. In a more traditional classification the expression would be classified as a PART-FOR-PART metonymy, where a part of the MEETING frame (PARTICIPANT) is accessed through another part of it (TIME).\footnote{Some authors deny that there are part-for-part metonymies. For instance Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2002) distinguish only source-in-target and target-in-source metonymies and leave space in their classification only for part-for-whole and whole-for-part metonymies ruling out part-for-part metonymies. My analysis of (7) would appear problematic according to these approaches, unless we consider ten o'clock to be a property of the person whom the mayor meets, in which case it would be part of the person's domain matrix, i.e. a source-in-target metonymy.}

As already pointed out, the class of THING-metonymies in my classification mostly coincides with the class of referential metonymies in earlier classifications, though it must be noted that this is not always the case. Let us consider the following expressions.

(8)  I'm your gunshot.\footnote{The example is from Showtime's television-series \textit{Nurse Jackie} (Season 2 Episode 8), where it is uttered by a patient with a gun-shot wound to a doctor who is looking for a patient she cannot find.}
(9)  She is just a pretty face. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 37)
(10) I'm the tiramisu. (Langacker 2008: 69)
These metonymies would qualify as predicational metonymies in pragmatically oriented classifications of metonymy (e.g. Barcelona 2009 and Panther & Thornburg 1999 and 2003b), since they are part of the predication. In my interpretation, in these cases a THING-type content is metonymically identified with another THING-type content, i.e. the target is reduced to, or metonymically identified with, one of its salient aspects which is especially relevant in a given frame or ICM. In (8) a PATIENT is accessed through her INJURY within an EMERGENCY ROOM frame, in (9) a PERSON is somewhat pejoratively reduced to one of her BODY PARTS and in (10) the same relationship applies within the same frame as in (1), the only difference being that here the CUSTOMER is reduced to and identified with one of its salient aspects (the MEAL she ordered) which is particularly relevant in the RESTAURANT frame. As to the mode, the mental access is provided with the help of the reference point, and as to the contents involved, these expressions do not differ from those in (1-5); they are all THING-metonymies, only differing in the role they play during meaning construction, i.e. they are applied when the propositional meaning is being constructed (see fn. 6.).

Finally, a closing remark should be made on the linguistic nature of the referent points of THING-metonymies. A brief glance at the expressions analyzed throughout Sub-section 3.1 suggests that the linguistic manifestations of THING-metonymies are overwhelmingly noun phrases or, in a relatively smaller number of cases, adjectives, leaving a few exceptions of other linguistic expressions (for instance ten o’clock in (7)).

### 3.2 EVENT-metonymies

EVENT-metonymies are metonymies whose target (or intended referent) is an EVENT which is accessed with the help of a reference point content that is related to it within the same ICM or SITUATION. The

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13 Up to these two classes Radden’s classification (see Section 1) is reminiscent of mine with the difference that he does not consider EVENT metonymies to be referential and due to the low number of his major classes (only referential and EVENT) they form larger and more heterogeneous groups than mine.

14 It should be noted that in the view of Radden and Dirven (2007) events are conceptually represented by so called EVENT-schemas which include the necessary participants and elements of the EVENT at hand. They form the conceptual core of a situation which they constitute together with so called peripheral elements.
category label EVENT is used here very broadly; a more fine-grained analysis would require its differentiation. I do not make a distinction between ACTIONS, CHANGES, EVENTS etc. and subsume all these under the umbrella term 'EVENT'. An EVENT can be accessed through one of its PARTICIPANTS (THING), through its PROPERTIES (i.e. its CIRCUMSTANCES, MANNER etc.), through one of its SUB-EVENTS (EVENT) or through its PRE-CONDITIONS or CONSEQUENCES (with these also usually being EVENTS).

In the following examples an EVENT is accessed by a THING that describes either a circumstance (11-12) or a participant of the EVENT (13), hence they can be considered THING-EVENT-metonymies.

(11) *Rick, I get it, you don't want to risk another Woodbury.*
(12) *Hun. Az űszi nyárban nagyon élveztem a vízpartot.*
    'In the autumn summer I enjoyed the waterside very much'

In (11) and (12) the PLACE where an EVENT (or series of events) occurred refers metonymically to the EVENT (or series of events), the only difference being that in the first case the event is known to the hearer and does not need to be described any more specifically, while in (12) the events that took place at the waterside need not be specified since it is deducible from our world knowledge that they are probably EVENTS (ACTIVITIES) typically associated with the PLACE.

    'I hate the dentist. I mean having to go to the dentist. You get it?!!'

Example (13) is a somewhat more complex case. In the first sentence, the EVENT of GOING TO THE DENTIST is accessed by the GOAL of the GOING EVENT-schema, namely the DENTIST (a THING), which serves as an ideal metonymic reference point, since people are more readily ac-

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15 The example is taken from the comic book *The Walking Dead* (Issue 68, p. 13).
tivated as the object of the feeling HATE than EVENTS. It must also be noted that in the second sentence the event of GOING TO THE DENTIST (a SUB-EVENT in a larger frame) provides mental access to another SUB-EVENT of the frame, namely the procedures a patient has to suffer at a dentist. The two metonymies form a metonymic chain. What makes the example all the more interesting is that after using a THING-EVENT-metonymy the speaker tries to provide a resolution of the metonymy she has just used but in doing so she uses another metonymy, namely one of the EVENT-EVENT type. Without this remark in which she corrects herself, her first THING-EVENT metonymy would probably be interpreted as meaning that she actually hates the procedures she has to suffer at the dentist, based on our knowledge of the DENTIST frame which includes the idea that the most painful part of the scenario is the procedure done by the dentist (i.e. it may be interpreted as an AGENT-FOR-ACTION metonymy). In other words the interpretation of the first metonymy would not require a chain of metonymies, but the second metonymy is inserted as an attempt at resolving the first metonymy. What the speaker wants to achieve is probably to make sure that she does not hate the dentist as a person, but the event that takes place at the dentist, i.e. it is enough to shift from a THING-EVENT metonymy to an EVENT-EVENT metonymy, and she does not have to correct herself in the form of a literal expression.

As can be seen from the analysis of (13), complex EVENTS can be referred to with their SUB-EVENTS serving as reference points (EVENT-EVENT-metonymies). The initial SUB-EVENT of a complex EVENT is very often picked as a reference point for the whole EVENT:

(14) to go to bed 'to have sex' (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 22)
(15) Hun. Már rég gyújtottam rá.
'I haven't lit up for a long time' i.e. 'I haven't lit a cigarette for a long time.'

The expression in (14) shows that the initial SUB-EVENT (GOING TO BED) for an EVENT (HAVING SEX) metonymy can be lexicalized. In (15) the initial SUB-EVENT of LIGHTING A CIGARETTE metonymically accesses the complex EVENT of SMOKING. The Hungarian sentence is a perfectly natural expression of the content that the speaker has not smoked for a long time, i.e. the initial and cognitively most salient SUB-EVENT (LIGHTING A CIGARETTE) refers to the whole EVENT of SMOKING.
The reverse path of providing access to EVENTS is also possible, i.e. SUB-EVENTS can be accessed through whole EVENTS:

(16) *He came at precisely 7:45 PM.* (Langacker 2008: 70)

(17) Hun. *Pontosan mikor mentek Debrecenbe?* 'When exactly are you going to Debrecen?'

In Langacker's example, the complex EVENT of COMING provides access to one of its SUB-EVENTS, namely to its terminal component of ARRIVAL (the metonymic shift is indicated by the use of the point-like temporal expression *7:45 PM*, which facilitates the metonymic interpretation). In other words, COMING refers to the relatively prominent SUB-EVENT of ARRIVAL; the expression is a linguistic manifestation of the conceptual metonymy EVENT FOR ITS SUB-EVENT. The Hungarian example (17) is similar with the only difference that here GOING stands for another prominent SUB-EVENT, namely DEPARTURE.

Other peripheral elements of an EVENT may also serve as a metonymic reference point to an EVENT:

(18) *She was able to finish her dissertation.* (Panther & Thornburg 1999: 334)

Panther and Thornburg analyze (18) in terms of the very abstract POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy. Here the subject’s ability to finish her dissertation (a PRE-CONDITION) refers to the actual accomplishment of finishing it.

As the variety of the examples discussed indicates, EVENT-metonymies are manifested on the level of linguistic expressions in an extreme heterogeneity of forms due to the immense variety of the cognitive reference points which can provide mental access to EVENTS. EVENTS are very complex conceptual structures in the sense that they are influenced by a large number of factors (participants, location, time, manner, intent etc.), they can be broken down into a theoretically infinite number of sub-events and they are connected to a principally infinite number of other EVENTS (among others their conceivable causes and effects). Their complexity opens up a wide range of choices between the possible cognitive reference points for
providing mental access, which in turn increases their variety regarding their linguistic manifestations.\footnote{Their formal diversity is also indicated by the results reported in the literature concerned with the role of conceptual metonymy in grammar. The examined grammatical phenomena are very often based on conceptual metonymies that would be candidates for \textit{EVENT}-metonymies in my classification, or are at least based on \textit{EVENT}-schemas (see for example the contributions in Panther, Thornburg & Barcelona 2009 or Radden & Dirven 2007).}

\section*{3.3 \textit{PROPERTY}-metonymies}

The target of \textit{PROPERTY}-metonymies is a \textit{PROPERTY}, or more precisely a \textit{SCALE} against which a \textit{PROPERTY} can be measured or a part of a \textit{PROPERTY}-\textit{SCALE}. A good example is provided in (19):

\begin{enumerate}
\item [(19)] \textit{high temperature} \cite{Radden (2002): 409}
\end{enumerate}

A \textit{PROPERTY} of a scale measuring temperature (the vertical extension of the mercury in the thermometer) provides mental access to a \textit{PROPERTY} of the temperature measured. In this case mental access is provided to the \textit{PROPERTY} of a \textit{THING} by another \textit{PROPERTY} of another, though related, \textit{THING}.\footnote{The expression in (19) may well be analyzed as a so called representational metonymy (for this notion see Warren 2006 or Barnden 2010): a property of the representation of temperature provides mental access to a property of the temperature.} A case in which a \textit{PROPERTY} of a \textit{THING} provides mental access to another \textit{PROPERTY} of the same \textit{THING} would be the use of \textit{tall} in (20), where the quantity of the whiskey is accessed through its vertical extension in a glass.

\begin{enumerate}
\item [(20)] \textit{Pour me a nice \textit{tall} whiskey.}
\end{enumerate}

Other well-known examples can be analyzed along these lines:

\begin{enumerate}
\item [(21a)] \textit{How \textit{tall} are you?} [vertical extension of the body]
\item [(21b)] Hun. \textit{Milyen magas vagy?}
\item [(22a)] (body) \textit{height}
\item [(22b)] Hun. \textit{testmagasság}
\item [(23a)] \textit{How \textit{old} is your brother?} [age]
\item [(23b)] Hun. \textit{Milyen idős a testvéred?}
\end{enumerate}
(24) Germ. *Wie spät ist es?* [time]
   Literally: 'How late is it?'
   'What time is it?'

In (21-24) one end of a SCALE serves as mental reference point to the whole SCALE. In (21) and (22) the upper end of the vertical extension scale (*tall, height*) refers to the whole scale. The same applies to (23), where instead of inquiring neutrally about one's age, the upper end of the SCALE is exploited metonymically. The German example (24) can be analyzed in a similar fashion: asking about time is performed with the help of referring to the upper SCALE of time measurement (*late*).

Based on the account of Radden and Kövecses (1999: 31-32) concerning the metonymic exploitation of the SCALE ICM it can be safely stated that not only the PROPERTIES of THINGS but also the PROPERTIES of EVENTS may be accessed with the help of one end of the SCALE:

(25) *Henry is speeding* again.

In (25) the verb *to speed* expresses MOTION by verbalizing it in terms of the MANNER-OF-MOTION. The conceptual motivation of the noun-verb conversion may be considered as a special case of a conceptual metonymy, namely an EVENT-metonymy where a PROPERTY serves as cognitive reference point. The expression is furthermore based on a PROPERTY metonymy, in which the UPPER-END-OF-THE-SCALE is picked out as reference point for the WHOLE-SCALE. Radden and Kövecses accommodate the metonymy at hand as a case of PART-WHOLE metonymy. They argue as follows: "Scales are a special class of things and the scalar units are parts of them" (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 31-32).

Finally I would like to point out that it is also possible to provide mental access to a PROPERTY with the help of its opposite, and since a PROPERTY and its opposite are part of the same SCALE (ICM), this shift can also be considered metonymic. According to this view, verbal

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18 The fact that two typologically unrelated languages (Hungarian and English) use the same strategy of conceptualizing a property may indicate that the upper end of a scale is widely used by languages to refer to whole scales, and that it is preferred to the lower end of the scale as a reference point to the whole scale.
irony motivated by conceptual metonymy can be considered as a sub-case of PROPERTY-metonymies:

(26a)  *That’s great news!* [bad news]
(26b)  Hun. *Ez nagyszerű hír!*
(27)  *That’s terrific news!* [good news]

In (26) a positive PROPERTY accesses its negative counterpart. The reverse of the direction of the shift from positive to negative is also possible, especially in colloquial language, where they can be lexicalized as in (27). In both cases we can talk about PROPERTY-PROPERTY-metonymies.

Though their research is somewhat neglected in cognitive semantics and the data and analyses are rather scarce, my examples suggest that PROPERTY-metonymies are overwhelmingly manifested in the form of adjectives or adverbs on the level of linguistic expressions.

### 3.4 PROPOSITION-metonymies

In my definition, PROPOSITION-metonymies are metonymies whose target is a PROPOSITION, i.e. in these metonymies a PROPOSITION is being referred to. I use the term ‘proposition’ here in a very broad, pre-theoretic sense: I define a PROPOSITION as a type of conceptual content that is more complex and specific than the more general and schematic content of an EVENT, hence my notion has less to do with truth-values, or the possibility of assigning a truth value to a proposition, than with the elaborate construal of a specific situation. PROPOSITIONS can be accessed through other PROPOSITIONS and through their own PARTS (partial PROPOSITIONS or PARTICIPANTS of a PROPOSITION):

(28)  [How did you get to the party?] *I hopped on a bus.* (Lakoff 1987: 79)
(29)  A: *How did you get to the airport?*
     B: *I waved down a taxi.* (Gibbs 1999: 66)

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19 For a proposal for assigning (at least partial) metonymic motivation to ironic expressions see Radden (2002: 416); for an approach that argues for a compatible but more complex treatment of irony see Voßhagen (1999).
(28) and (29) are well-known examples of the cognitive linguistic literature on metonymy. (29) originates from Gibbs, but has also been analyzed by Warren (1999: 121) to demonstrate the difference between referential and propositional metonymies. Both examples are instances of PROPOSITION-metonymies in which a PROPOSITION is used as a reference point in order to mentally access another related PROPOSITION (that is why I highlighted no particular part in the expression). In (28) 'I got to the party in a bus' (proposition B) is accessed through the proposition 'I hopped on a bus' (proposition A), where proposition A is a necessary pre-condition of proposition B which leads to the realization of B with a high probability. The same applies to (29), where proposition A 'I waved down a taxi' leads to a probable realization of proposition B 'I got to the airport by taxi'.

It has also been pointed out by Warren (1999, 2002, and especially 2006: 7-11) that the propositions in a propositional metonymy are linked by a weak if-then relation, i.e. proposition A does not necessarily lead to proposition B. However, if proposition B holds, proposition A is so to say presupposed by proposition B, and the link between them is strong enough that mentioning proposition A allows us to mentally access proposition B with ease. Warren traces back the strength of the relation between A and B to conceptual and communicative/pragmatic factors.

The production and processing of expressions like (28) and (29) are made possible, according to Warren, on the one hand, because the two propositions are conceptualized as being contiguous, and on the other, because the context makes the interpretation B more relevant than A. The first prerequisite is clearly in accordance with my view that PROPOSITIONS as conceptual content are not completely different from THINGS as conceptual content. If PROPOSITIONS can be conceptualized as being contiguous (though I suppose in a metaphorically extended sense) it may not be too far-fetched to claim that they can also be referred to. The consideration of the second prerequisite may be very fruitful. The role of relevance in the choice of the target and source in metonymy has already been pointed out (for instance Radden & Kövecses 1999: 50-51 or Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez Velasco 2004).

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20 This claim is in accordance with Panther and Thornburg's view on the contingent nature of metonymy (Panther & Thornburg 2004 and 2007, Panther 2005).

21 For the metaphorical extension of the category 'contiguity' see Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a and 2006b) and the brief discussion of their approach in Section 4.
Examples (30) and (31) are cases where it can be assumed that a PROPOSITION is accessed through one of its elements (hence the highlights).

(30) *I don’t want to end up with a bullet in my brain.*
(31) *Jones would be unlikely to sue us.* (Langacker 1999: 200)

In (30) a proposition (‘I have a bullet in my brain’) provides mental access to a larger proposition (‘I die as a result of having a bullet in my brain’). The Subject-to-Subject raising construction in (31) has already been analyzed in terms of metonymy by Langacker (1999: 200), and his analysis strongly supports my claims regarding the possibility of referring to NON-THINGS: "the "raised" nominal (Jones) stands metonymically for the clausal event (Jones sue us) that participates directly in the main-clause relationship (be unlikely). Its referent is a kind of local topic for purposes of construing the infinitival complement […]" [my italics M.T.]. In other words, a proposition (‘Jones sue us’) is accessed through one of its elements (Jones).

Finally, two comments should be made on PROPOSITION-metonymies. First, some EVENT-metonymies – especially those where an EVENT serves as a metonymic reference point to a related EVENT – are hard to distinguish from PROPOSITION-metonymies (consider for example Langacker’s wording "for the clausal event” and my classification of (31) as a PROPOSITION-metonymy). The boundaries between the two categories are rather fuzzy. Until we have further psychological or neurological evidence for distinguishing between these two types of conceptual content the distinction remains only intuitive.

Secondly, though these expressions are motivated by conceptual metonymies and trigger metonymic inferential processes, they cannot readily be considered linguistic metonymies. A piece of propositional information may serve as input for further inferences in any form (not even expressed linguistically). For instance, let us consider (29)

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22 Serious attempts have been made to integrate elements of Relevance Theory and cognitive linguistics into a hybrid theory in the field of metaphor research (Tendahl & Gibbs 2008 and Tendahl 2009). For a critical analysis and evaluation of these attempts see Csatár (2014: Chapter 4). A similar integrative framework regarding metonymy could also prove to be profitable.
again briefly: Speaker A makes a metonymy guided inference based on what Speaker B expresses with linguistic means in the form of a proposition (‘I waved down a taxi’) and arrives at B’s intended proposition (‘I got to the party in a taxi’). In another situation A may very well draw the same conclusion with the help of the same metonymic inference schema based on the same information coming from a non-linguistic source, for example she sees B waving down a taxi, and later on meeting B at the party, she may conclude that B arrived in a taxi. Note that the only difference is the linguistic vs. non-linguistic nature of the input information of the inference. In the first case it is a linguistically expressed proposition (a linguistic reference point) and in the second it is a piece of perceptual information (serving as a cognitive reference point for mentally accessing another proposition).

Accordingly, these cases, assuming that they are analyzed as being motivated by conceptual metonymy, may be instances of metonymic inferences and metonymic thinking, rather than metonymic language. Not considering these cases as linguistic metonymies is further supported by the fact stated by Warren (1999, 2002 and 2006) that propositional metonymies do not violate truth conditions, hence they can be taken literally, in which case they do not trigger further inferences, i.e. they do not provide indirect access to other conceptual contents, unlike referential metonymies. In other words, in the case of PROPOSITION-metonymies there are no linguistic clues that would lead the hearer to elaborate a metonymic interpretation, as opposed to the majority of referential metonymies, where linguistic clues – for instance phenomena similar to Pustejovsky’s type coercion (Pustejovsky 1991, 1995) – indicate that a metonymic interpretation is called for. What triggers the metonymic interpretation in cases like (29) is information from our world knowledge and general pragmatic principles such as the principle of relevance proposed by relevance theorists.23

23 It is important to note that I do not deny that the possibility of metonymic interpretation is also dependent on language specific factors, i.e. the degree of conventionality and the applicability of some metonymic paths (or natural inference schemas) can differ from language to language to a considerable extent (see for example Panther & Thornburg 1999, Brdar 2009 or Radden & Seto 2003).
3.5 **Speech act metonymies**

The last type of metonymy I am concerned with in this section is so-called speech act or illocutionary metonymy (Thornburg & Panther 1997, Panther & Thornburg 1998, 1999 and 2003b). In this type a certain communicative intention is accessed with the help of a linguistic form otherwise associated with a different communicative intention, i.e. they make it possible for the hearer to infer an implicit intention of the speaker disguised in the form of another intention, or in other words, seeming intentions provide mental access to other intentions. In Panther and Thornburg’s (1999: 346) analyses, (32) – as an instance of the POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY metonymy – qualifies as an example.

(32) *Can you pass the salt?* (Panther & Thornburg 1999: 346)

The question form seemingly indicates the intent of the speaker to get information about the ability of the hearer to do something, but with the help of the context and a metonymic inference schema the speaker’s implicit intention to make a request is accessed indirectly.²⁴ It is important to note that my second comment on PROPOSITION-metonymies also applies to speech act metonymies, in that they are not exclusively connected to linguistic forms (it is enough to mention gesticulation, facial expressions or simply when intentions are expressed by and inferred on the basis of methods other than speech acts).

4 **A contiguity-based and a pragmatic classification of metonymy**

Before concluding my paper it is worthwhile to compare and contrast my approach with other cognitive linguistic approaches to the classification of metonymy. In this section I would like to compare my approach based on the type of the conceptual content involved in metonymy with a contiguity-based definition and typology of metonymy

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²⁴ The ‘Can you/Could you X’ construction is conventionalized in English as a construction associated with making requests, which seems to indicate that the speech act metonymy described here has become a conventionalized part of the pragmatic meaning of the construction at hand.

The classification of Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006a and 2006b) is based on an insight formulated by John R. Taylor as follows: "This character suggests a rather broader understanding of metonymy than that given by traditional rhetoric. The entities need not be contiguous, in any spatial sense. Neither is metonymy restricted to the act of reference." (Taylor 1995: 124, my italics M.T.). Peirsman and Geeraerts examine the relationship between contiguity and metonymy and have elaborated on the notion of contiguity. Namely, they systematically consider cases of conceptual contiguity in its spatial and non-spatial senses. The essence of their approach is that they define contiguity on a conceptual level, i.e. their notion of contiguity is not restricted to a spatial sense, although they consider it the central case of the prototypically organized category of contiguous relationships. They extend the core of the category along three dimensions (strength of contact, boundedness and domain) which deploy different degrees of prototypicality, often using metaphoric strategies of category extension.

Accordingly, in their approach, the prototypical contiguity relationship between two conceptual entities is a part-whole relationship (i.e. the absolute proximity on the strength of contact scale) between two bounded entities in a spatial domain. Less prototypical cases are located further away from the core along the three above mentioned continua (weaker contact between less bounded entities in non-spatial domains). Peirsman and Geeraerts argue that this notion of contiguity as a prototypically organized category accounts for a great majority of metonymic patterns within the framework of cognitive linguistics, i.e. in the analytic sections of their paper they define and classify metonymy in terms of their extended notion of contiguity.

As can be seen, Taylor points out that two notions traditionally considered to be definitional properties of metonymy (contiguity and referentiality) cannot be applied without any further reflection to the notion of metonymy in the light of the results of the cognitive linguistic research done in the field. The idea that the application of the notion of contiguity as it had been used in traditional approaches to metonymy (in a strictly spatial sense) is not adequate to describe the conceptual processes assumed to be metonymic by cognitive linguists is clearly reflected by his adding the remark "in any spatial sense".
What Peirsman and Geeraerts' work achieves is a cognitive linguistically more applicable notion of contiguity which can be used for a systematic account of earlier uncovered metonymic patterns.

Elsewhere (Tóth in preparation) I have attempted to do the same with the notion of referentiality. In its present form I cannot readily agree with Taylor's observation that metonymy cannot be restricted to an act of reference. As pointed out in Section 2, in my view the formulation would require the same remark as "in any spatial sense" in the case of contiguity, accordingly I accept the above mentioned observation in a slightly modified form, namely I share the assumption that metonymy cannot be restricted to an act of reference in the traditional sense of the term 'reference' and I argue that an act of reference cannot be restricted to cases where a nominal expression singles out a piece of the extra-linguistic world, or more precisely a THING-type conceptual content.

My approach and that of Peirsman and Geeraerts are in accordance but they consider different aspects of metonymy. They need not be measured against each other; they are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. What they have in common is that both approaches consider metonymy as a prototypically structured category whose prototypicality is a natural consequence of the prototypical organization of the categories with the help of which they are defined, i.e. a prototypically organized category of contiguity in Peirsman and Geeraerts' approach and a prototypically organized category of referentiality in my approach, but it is not unreasonable to assume that the category 'metonymy' may be organized along multiple axes regarding its properties which show prototype effects.

The differences lie in the perspective the two approaches take to the aspects of metonymy. Peirsman and Geeraerts concentrate on the relationship between the conceptual contents connected by metonymy whereas I have focused on the nature of the conceptual content connected by the metonymic relationship. In this latter respect it is important to note that the prototypical case of the zero contiguity relation (part-whole) between two bounded conceptual entities in the spatial domain is compatible with the prototypical case of reference where a prototypical THING is used to provide mental access to another prototypical THING. Peirsman and Geeraerts' classification also makes use of the type of the conceptual content connected by a contiguity relation, since the 'boundedness' of a conceptual entity is defined by the type of conceptual content it belongs to.
The major difference between their approach and mine is which aspect of the metonymical relationship is emphasized: Peirsman and Geeraerts concentrate on the contiguity-based relationship connecting conceptual contents whereas my approach concentrates on the nature of the conceptual content connected by the metonymic relationship. The fact pointed out by Peirsman and Geeraerts that NON-THINGS can also stand in a contiguity relationship (a property traditionally associated with spatial objects) also indicates that THING-like and NON-THING-like conceptual contents are not completely different in certain respects, which in turn further supports my claim that basically any type of conceptual content can be mentally accessed, i.e. referred to.

Among the pragmatic classifications of metonymy the most widely held and applied is Panther and Thornburg’s (Thornburg & Panther 1997, Panther & Thornburg 1999, 2003b, 2003c, 2007). In their view, conceptual metonymies serve as natural inference schemas, i.e. more or less conventionalized paths leading from source to target, which facilitate inferences drawn at every level or phase of meaning construction. They classify metonymies according to their pragmatic function, i.e. at which level of the meaning construction a certain metonymy is applied.

Referential metonymies such as the ham sandwich in (1) are cases of indirect reference, their function is to refer to things (in the traditional sense) and make them available for predications. Predicational metonymies as in (8-10) are employed in the interpretation of metonymic predicates. These two types are labeled by Panther and Thornburg as propositional metonymies, since they are applied during the construction of propositions. The third group of metonymies consists of so called illocutionary metonymies which are inference schemas that guide us by arriving at explicatures and implicatures. Panther and Thornburg also point out that metonymies with different functions can co-occur in the interpretation of the same expression and that “conceptual metonymies often cut across the pragmatic types” (2007: 247).

Despite the different notions of reference they rely on, the content-based approach proposed here and Panther and Thornburg’s classification are not incompatible, but focus on different aspects of meton-
ymy. If we set aside what is understood by reference, it still remains a fact that at different levels of the pragmatic meaning construction process different types of conceptual content are accessed. During reference-fixing (in the traditional sense) we mentally activate THINGS; when we interpret predications, usually EVENTS are accessed; the construction of propositions calls for the combination of THINGS, EVENTS and PROPERTIES; and in order to arrive at explicatures and implicatures we access PROPOSITIONS or parts of PROPOSITIONS.26

5 Conclusion

My argumentation has been founded on the assumption that any type of conceptual content can be accessed by a reference point; hence the target of an act of reference cannot be reduced to THINGS. Consequently any type of conceptual content can be made available metonymically, and conceptual metonymies can be classified based on the type of the target and source content. The preliminaries of such a classification were outlined in Section 3. I have tried to show that the notion of referentiality proposed in Section 1 can provide us with the basis of a typology of metonymy according to what type of conceptual content is accessed indirectly through what type of cognitive and linguistic reference points. My classification suggests that the prototypicality of metonymies depends heavily on the type of conceptual content accessed and the type of conceptual content that serves as the reference point.

The content-based approach to the classification of metonymy turns out to be compatible with already established classifications based on the relationship between source and target and those based on their pragmatic function. My aim was not to challenge pre-existing classifications of metonymy, but to show that the consideration of a somewhat neglected aspect of conceptual metonymy (the content involved) is a promising line of investigation. It seems that the different

26 What I have outlined here is far from a fully-fledged model of pragmatic meaning construction that can accommodate conceptual metonymy as one of its general principles. My aim was simply to show that the two approaches are compatible and that the question of how conceptual metonymy can be accommodated within, or reconciled with, current theories of general pragmatic meaning construction is a promising line of investigation.
aspects focused on by the different classifications (relationship between source and target, content type of source and target, and pragmatic function) are interrelated and heavily interdependent. Different types of contents can be related by different contiguity-based connections, and certain types of content are accessed during certain phases of pragmatic meaning construction.

It must be noted that my classification is somewhat preliminary and, of course, in need of further refinements and stronger empirical foundations. As can be seen, the data on which my argumentation has been built come from three sources. The majority of the examples discussed are well-know from the literature (most of them created by other authors), some of them have been created and analyzed based on my own intuition and introspection, and a minority of them has come to my attention sporadically. Further systematic, empirically founded case studies applying a content-based classification would shed more light on the general applicability, deficiencies and possible benefits of the approach.

Finally, it has to be admitted that my content-based approach does not suffice to describe all aspects of conceptual metonymy; systematic case studies should be conducted in an integrative way taking into consideration (i) the type of the conceptual content accessed by the metonymic reference point; (ii) the type of the conceptual content serving as the reference point; (3) the relationship between the target and the source content and (4) the role the metonymic activation of a certain content plays in pragmatic meaning construction, i.e. the pragmatic function of the metonymy. These integrative investigations may shed light on the ways in which these aspects are interrelated and dependent on each other, which in turn may contribute to a better understanding of metonymy as a conceptual mechanism, as a meaning construction device and as a linguistic phenomenon.

References
Preliminaries to a content-based classification of metonymy


Source of the examples

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