András Kertész:
Darüber, wie ich darüber denke, wie man darüber denkt, wie Quine denkt. Bemerkungen zum Umgang mit Interpretationen von philosophischen Werken
Abstract:
The author answers Zoltán Vecsey’s comments on a particular aspect of Kertész’ book entitled Metalinguistik by putting forward three kinds of arguments. He shows, firstly, that Vecsey’s approach is just one of many possible interpretations of Quine’s work and that, therefore, his philological analyses are irrelevant to the workability of Kertész’ ‘reflective-heuristic naturalism’ whose elaboration was governed by very different methodological principles, background assumptions and aims. Secondly, he shows that, although in the light of current pluralism the premisses may be disputed, in the literature they are known as possible alternatives to other interpretations and may be used, therefore, for heuristic purposes. Finally, he also proves that, for logical reasons, irrespective of whether Vecsey’s arguments are correct or not, Kertész’ approach to the philosophy of linguistics would yield exactly the same results.
