Zoltán Vecsey:
Naturalismus und Metatheorie. Über die erkenntnistheoretische These von András Kertész’ Metalinguistik

Following Quine naturalists contend that philosophically significant statements have contents that are scientifically respectable. The central idea today in naturalistically motivated epistemology is that the methods for investigating philosophical issues are similar to, or identical with, those used to investigate scientific issues. András Kertész argues in his book Metalinguistik that this methodological claim has paradoxical consequences: based on scientific insights Quine rejects the heritage of traditional epistemology, but his metatheoretical reasoning itself has epistemological character. The paper emphasizes that this prima facie contradiction can be easily removed. Considered from a classical systematical point of view naturalised epistemology does not coincide with metascience. As a philosophical discipline it investigates primarily the origin of our knowledge of the world, and states that perceptual experience is continuous with scientific knowledge.

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