Péter Csatár:
Zirkularität und Metaphernforschung

According to the argumentation of David Ritchie (2003) several models proposed in current research on metaphors (Keysar & Glucksberg 1992, Chiappe & Kennedy 2001) are based on circular reasoning, and are therefore unsuited to describe the mental procedure of the processing of metaphors. In other models (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Fauconnier & Turner 2002) such reasoning errors do not appear. However, the notion of circularity employed by Ritchie is so crude that his conclusions can not be accepted (or discarded). Such a broad understanding of this concept does not allow us to differentiate between vicious and harmless logical circularity, which is a standard distinction in the philosophy of science (Stegmüller 1979). Ritchie overrates and overstates the role of the circle. In my reflections I would like to point out that the overestimation of a single factor can lead to a false appreciation of theories of metaphor and that careful examination of other, similar problems is needed to be able to attain well-founded value judgments.

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